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Elisabetta Gualmini (Bologna)
Labour Market Policies In Italy.
The 1990s and the New Wave of Reforms
In den 90er Jahren wurde die italienische Arbeitsmarktpolitik radikal reformiert. Die Anzahl aktiver
Maßnahmen wurde erheblich erhöht, das Staatsmonopol in der Arbeitsvermittlung abgeschafft, und
neue Programme für lokale Entwicklung beginnen, alte zentralistische Ansätze abzulösen. Diese
Veränderungen resultierten in einem neuen politischen Kontext, der durch die Rückkehr kooperativer
und konsensualer Tauschbeziehungen zwischen Regierung und Sozialpartnern, den Fall der ‚Ersten
Republik’ und das Entstehen der ‚Zweiten Republik’, sowie die Handlungsspielräume im Rahmen des
Europäischen Integrationsprozesses gekennzeichnet ist. Die Verkoppelung der Transformationen
politischer Prozesse um den Arbeitsmarkt (‚politics’) mit dem Wandel von ‚policies’ hat einen neuen
Evolutionspfad für das Angehen der Arbeitslosenproblematik geschaffen, der es Italien auch zu
ermöglichen scheint, sich europäischen Standards und Forderungen zu nähern.
1. Introduction
In Italy, the 1990s have been characterised by
relevant innovations in the field of labour poli-
cies. After almost fifty years marked by high
policy inertia and by the incremental extension
of the past inherited programmes (mainly ad-
dressing the income maintenance of workers
instead of the promotion of new employment)
some clear changes can be observed. Between
1993 and 1999, policy change was intense: wage
indexations were abolished; collective bargain-
ing procedures were deeply reformed; respon-
sibility for labour policies were decentralised,
shifting from the state to the regions; prohibi-
tions for private placement were dismantled; and
new measures for local development and em-
ployability were introduced, particularly aimed
at tackling massive unemployment in the Mezzo-
giorno.
The extraordinary simultaneity between the
reform of the labour market and the institutional
changes that have marked the transition from
the First to the Second Republic cannot be un-
derestimated. Only after the fall of the First
Republic, policy makers began to enjoy new
opportunities and scope for implementing re-
forms and for engaging in a process of learning
and change.
This article intends to reconstruct the devel-
opment of labour policies in Italy during the
1990s in strict connection with the changes oc-
curred in the institutional context surrounding
the policies, the main hypothesis being that the
reforms of the 1990s have strongly depended
on the wider institutional transformations that
have affected the Italian political system. In the
first part of the article the historical sequence of
policy changes in the field of the Italian labour
market – from the 1950s to the 1990s – will be
presented. Particular emphasis will be given to
the reforms of the 1990s and to their discon-
tinuous characteristics with respect to the pre-
vious decades. In the second part we will then
try to explain labour policy development and
reforms by looking at the transformations of the
Italian political and industrial relations system,
namely the return of concerted action, the fall
of the post-war party system and party govern-
ment as well as the consequences of the process
of European integration. It will be conclusively
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argued that policy outputs are highly “embed-
ded” phenomena, their nature and effectiveness
being more the by-product of political institu-
tions manoeuvring according to their interests
and values than of general goal attainment and
problem solving processes.
2. Snapshots on the Historical Context
At least three intertwined phenomena
characterised the state’s regulation of the labour
market up until the 1990s: a) the dominance of
passive policies; b) the preference for insurance-
based benefits; and c) the state’s monopolistic
control over placement offices. They were the
direct result of the post-war policy instruments
that originally moulded the public intervention
in the labour market: regular unemployment
benefits (indennità ordinaria di disoccu-
pazione), regular short-time earnings compen-
sation benefits (cassa integrazione guadagni
ordinaria), centralised employment services
(collocamento pubblico). The three pillars were
bound to forge labour market institutional regu-
lation during the following fifty years.1
Both, the unemployment benefits and the
short-time earning compensation benefits, were
insurance-based instruments and income sup-
port programmes, that is, passive policies pro-
tecting the workers already benefiting from a
job-contractual relationship (the “insiders”). The
“outsiders”, especially the young and the wo-
men, in search for the first job or just lacking
the contributions for eligibility, were completely
excluded. The lack of active policies, notwith-
standing the masses of unemployed in the im-
mediate post-war era, was rooted in the prefer-
ence given by the state to the male adult regular
workers who were supposed to provide assis-
tance not only for themselves but also for their
family (the so-called “breadwinner model”).2 In
addition, in 1949 (law 264) a strict state’s con-
trol on placement offices was established. Trade
unions were deprived of any kind of functions,
and each responsibility for placement was cen-
tralised in the hands of the Ministry of Labour.
As for employment services, labour policies
were therefore characterised by high centra-
lisation; as for passive policies, they were built
on a culture of extended state’s aid, especially
supported by the Christian-democratic party,
which was constantly in power until the early
1990s. This policy model developed unchanged
until the mid-1970s; during the “golden age” of
the 1960s, when the unemployment rate fell
under 4 per cent no one would have dared to
question it. But in the 1970s and in the 1980s,
shaped by a tremendous economic crisis and a
swift growth of unemployment, the inner con-
tradictions of the inherited policies became
overtly visible.
From 1972 to 1979, the unemployment rate
rose in fact from 6.4 per cent to 7.7 per cent.
The number of the unemployed increased both
in the Centre-North and in the South: respec-
tively from 2.8 per cent to 6.2 per cent and from
5.5 per cent to 10.9 per cent.3 In addition, the
first statistics on the underground economy re-
vealed the existence of two million under-em-
ployed people (Frey 1974; Censis 1976).
The debate on labour policies jumped onto
the forefront of the political agenda. Policy
makers agreed on the necessity to switch to mi-
cro-economic policies, which should be prima-
rily addressed to the weak categories of the
labour market. Between 1976 and 1979, in the
period of the “national solidarity government”,
when the communist party was for the first time
included in the coalition, some important active
labour policies were passed, following a corpo-
ratist agreement between the social partners and
the Ministry of Labour. In particular, three
programmes are worth mentioning: the law for
youth employment (285/1977), the law on in-
dustrial reorganisation and restructuring (675/
1977) and the general law on vocational train-
ing (845/1978).
In general, however, these three first attempts
to move towards flexibility and employability
were only partly successful. The number of ap-
plicants was very limited, the new responsible
institutions – above all for training – showed
high propensity to reproduce the old state’s
programmes and EC funds were scarcely used.
In the first half of the 1980s, the path towards
active policies was taken up again. Thanks to
concertation, the issue of deregulation gained
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again a central position in the political agenda.
The continuous rise of unemployment and in-
flation was more and more perceived as the
outcome of the high rigidity of the Italian labour
market in terms of hiring procedures, firing con-
straints and working time regimes. From 1980
to 1989, unemployment almost doubled, mov-
ing from 7.6 per cent to 12 per cent. The same
was true for the Southern regions where it rose
from 11.5 per cent to 21.1 per cent.
To cope with mass unemployment it was no
longer possible to rely on mid-term interven-
tions and on income support subsidies. Espe-
cially in the Southern regions, it seemed neces-
sary to change labour policy strategies radically
in order to expand companies’ productive ca-
pacity and to promote job creation. To pursue
such an ambitious goal a new social pact with
economic interest groups seemed to be the right
way. In 1983, national trade unions, employ-
ers’ peak associations and the Minister of
Labour signed an important agreement, which
was in fact a complex political exchange among
income policies, fiscal policies and incentives
policies. As far as labour policies were con-
cerned, the agreement introduced a set of new
policy instruments in favour of higher flexibil-
ity in the labour market.
Law 863/1984, following the agreement, in-
troduced three new instruments, all belonging
to the family of deregulation policies: work-
sharing agreements or solidarity contracts
(contratti di solidarietà),4 work and training
contracts (contratti di formazione e lavoro) and
part time. The main beneficiaries of the new leg-
islation were the women and the young.
In the second part of the decade, the condi-
tions of the economy improved significantly,5
except for unemployment which kept on soar-
ing. Decision makers tried again the path of
deregulation with two important active policies:
the law on youth entrepreneurship (44/1986) and
the reform of employment services (57/1987).
A set of financial incentives for young employ-
ers creating new firms and co-operatives was
established. The Southern regions were the
privileged beneficiaries. In addition, regional
commissions for employment were created with
the specific task to foster employability, and the
procedures for placement were partially simpli-
fied.
In sum, until the end of the 1980s, Italian
labour policies were marked by ambiguous
trends: on the one side, the extension and wid-
ening of passive policies – that is, of social shock
absorbers for the insiders of the labour market
– was never questioned; on the other side, some
timid steps towards flexibility and active poli-
cies – in favour of the outsiders of the labour
market – were taken, but their implementation
was modest and their impact was somehow
made pointless by the abundant provision of
passive programmes.
3. The 1990s and the “Big Reform”
The economic recovery that had characterised
the second half of the 1980s was soon after bro-
ken by the new recession of 1992. In the same
year, due to high international speculation, the
lira devaluated and exited the EMS. The year
1992 has to be remembered as a sort of annus
fatalis. Not only did the conditions of the do-
mestic economy and finance dramatically
worsen, but at the same time, the Maastricht
requisites for joining the EMU made financial
adjustment more and more compelling. In such
a difficult situation, unemployment did not hint
at declining. In 1995, it reached again 12 per
cent, its major component being long-term un-
employment. The territorial dualism widened as
in the South unemployment surpassed 20 per
cent, while in the North it hardly touched 8 per
cent. In addition, the employment rate started
to decline, after twenty years of positive growth:
from 48.9 in 1992 to 46.9 in 1995.
The performance of the labour market slightly
improved in the second part of the decade, but
this was not sufficient to modify the overall pic-
ture. The employment rate increased from 47
per cent in 1996 to 53.4 per cent in 1999, which
positively influenced the citizens’ general pro-
pensity to look for a job, making the participa-
tion rate jump from 53.5 per cent to 60 per cent.
The total unemployment rate declined from 12.1
per cent to 11.1 per cent. Female unemployment
decreased from 16.6 per cent to 15.2 per cent,
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while male unemployment declined from 9.4 per
cent to 8.5 per cent. By contrast, youth unem-
ployment continued its slow increase, reaching
32 per cent in 1999 and 57 per cent and 53 per
cent in such regions as Calabria and Campania.
The gap between the North and the South also
widened. From 1996 to 1999, the unemploy-
ment rate grew from 21.7 per cent to 22.8 per
cent in the Mezzogiorno, while it diminished in
the Centre-North from 7.7 per cent to 7.5 per
cent (ISTAT, 1992–1999).
Facing such alarming conditions, the govern-
ments initiated an extraordinary cycle of reforms
involving at least four different issues: a)
concertation and income policies; b) priva-
tisation and decentralisation of employment ser-
vices; c) policies for local development (the so-
called “negotiated planning”, programmazione
negoziata); d) convergence towards the Euro-
pean standards and directives.
In 1992, an important trilateral agreement
between the government (Amato) and the so-
cial partners opened the way to renewed
concertation after a long period of silence and
suspension. In the field of the labour market,
the innovations concerned the abolition of wage
indexations (scala mobile) fifty years after their
introduction, the establishment of a periodical
session of income policy and the reform of col-
lective bargaining.
The system of indexations was based on a
strict link between wage increases in the public
and private sectors and the national inflation
levels. Starting from the 1980s, this automatic
mechanism began to be perceived as the main
culprit for a self-nurturing spiral between wages
and inflation, which left the dynamic of public
debt out of control. Until 1992, the opposition
of trade unions to the abolishment of the scala
mobile was strong, but in that year, the intoler-
able conditions of the public debt and the need
to pursue economic adjustment in order to en-
ter the EMU made them surrender.
 One year later, Prime Minister Ciampi re-
vived concerted action. The main purpose was
to agree on a new virtuous system of income
policies able to flexibly adjust to the expected
inflation rate. Two different sessions of income
policy were outlined: the session of May-June,
concerning the definition of the main objectives
of the state’s budgetary policies and the session
of September, devoted to sketch the parameters
of wage policies in parallel with the annual fi-
nancial law. In addition, a new structure of col-
lective bargaining was organised on the basis
of two negotiation levels: the national one and
the firm or territorial one.
The second direction of reform in the 1990s
was privatisation and decentralisation of em-
ployment services. The state’s monopoly on
placement was for the first time interrupted by
the Treu law of 1997 no. 196 (from the name of
the Ministry of Labour), which legalised tem-
porary work after two condemnation sentences
of the European Court of Justice, allowing pri-
vate agencies to organise their own employment
services. In the meantime, temporary work, as
it was already stated in the 1993 Ciampi’s agree-
ment, was allowed in the industrial and service
sector and, only experimentally, in agriculture
and construction (Biagi 1997). Large cities of
the Northern regions were the main beneficia-
ries of this measure.
The law on temporary work was soon fol-
lowed by a legislative decree (no. 469/1997)
introducing the reform of public employment
services. This reform was based on three main
imperatives: institutional decentralisation, ad-
mission of private organisations and associations
in the management of placement, and devolu-
tion of the related active policies to the regions.
The new functions of placement were consid-
ered as constituent part of active labour market
policies and not just – as in the past – as pure
administrative functions (Varesi 1998; Ghirotti
1998; Reyneri 1998; Amendola et al. 1997).
Trade unions and employers too, after fifty years
of formal exclusion, are now allowed to play an
active role in job placement initiatives.
Regional laws, disciplining in detail the new
services, were introduced between 1998 and
1999: for the major part they announced the cre-
ation of job centres at the provincial level, giv-
ing back to the provinces a relevant political and
administrative role. In their turn, the provinces
can delegate to the municipalities some tasks
and functions. Moreover, in order to grant co-
ordination among the various institutions, a tri-
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partite (public/private) regional commission
(Commissione regionale tripartita) and an in-
ter-institutional co-ordination committee
(Comitato interistituzionale di coordinamento),
consisting of representatives of the regional and
local levels, were established.
The regions were also given important func-
tions in the field of active policies. Only pas-
sive policies remained under the control of the
state (but their complete reform is now being
discussed in parliament). The transfer of active
policies from the centre to the periphery was
based on the exigency to bring the regulation of
labour programmes nearer to the territory, to the
needs and requests of the people living in the
different local areas.
The importance of localism and local
autonomy is also the goal of the new policies
for local development, the third innovation of
the 1990s. Under the name of “negotiated plan-
ning” (programmazione negoziata) one can find
a wide menu of policy measures aimed at fos-
tering local entrepreneurship, at valorising lo-
cal resources and institutional capabilities and
finally, at creating new jobs. The programmes
are numerous and are primarily based on a mix
of training and job creation, of qualification and
work. The most significant of them are territo-
rial pacts and area contracts.
Territorial pacts consist in operating proce-
dures and new bargaining tools to develop busi-
ness, co-operatives and employment initiatives
in a particular territory, exploiting productive
and natural resources that characterise the dif-
ferent local areas. Bargaining does not rely upon
the traditional triangle, that is upon unions,
employers and the government, but on an open
network of private and public actors (such as
banks, chambers of commerce, non-profit as-
sociations etc.), sharing common policy prob-
lems and co-participating (with the state) in the
financing of the initiatives. In 1998 and 1999,
more than one hundred territorial pacts were
proposed to the National Committee for
Economy and Work. They were especially con-
centrated in the Mezzogiorno (ISFOL 2000).
Area contracts have the same goal as territo-
rial pacts, the pursuit of employability in de-
pressed areas. They are different from pacts
because they refer to areas where there already
exist industrial activities (though in crisis). They
are signed in order to avoid mass dismissals.
Unions are willing to not respect the national
contractual standard and to agree on wage and
administrative flexibility. Also area contracts are
swiftly diffusing.
Generally, these policies for local develop-
ment must be considered more than labour poli-
cies; they reveal a wider concept of integration,
based on local and industrial development, or
rather on the revitalisation of the territory, glo-
bally considered.
The last innovations of the 1990s have less to
do with the transformations in national decision
making but rather with the recent developments
in supra-national policy making. Already start-
ing from Delors’ “White Book” of 1993, the
promotion of employment became a central
strategy for the European Commission. In 1995,
a work group was established, headed by the
Spanish Westendorp, with the task to outline the
main lines of reform of the Treaty and to in-
clude the employment issue. In 1997, the
Amsterdam Treaty established a procedure of
“multilateral guidance” in the sector of employ-
ment, based on horizontal strategies of co-ordi-
nation and control among the member states and
on vertical relationships of confrontation and
benchmarking between the member states and
the European institutions (Cassina 1998).
During the extraordinary summit meeting on
employment, which was held in Luxembourg
in November 1997, the Amsterdam guidelines
received formal ratification. More in detail, four
main principles were adopted as the core im-
peratives of each labour market policy: employ-
ability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal
opportunities. As a response to the Luxembourg
process, starting from 1998, the member states
have been called to formulate an annual National
Action Plan including the objectives and aims
of labour policies and the instruments for their
evaluation.
In March 1999, the Italian government for-
mulated its second NAP, which is divided into
four parts corresponding to the four pillars of
the Luxembourg process. The first part focuses
on the measures to encourage new employment
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for the weak categories of the labour market. A
new “preventive” approach has been thought for
the young, based on an intense activity of ori-
entation and counselling; while for the adults
and the long-term unemployed public utility
works and fiscal incentives constitute the main
strategies. The second part is centred on the in-
struments to develop the growth and diffusion
of small and medium-sized companies, which
are considered as potential containers of new
job opportunities. The third part of the national
action plan includes the initiatives to modernise
and innovate the organisation of work in pri-
vate businesses and in the public administration.
The flexibilisation of the working time plays a
central role: part time, work sharing, job rota-
tion etc. Finally, the fourth part of the plan is
devoted to policies for fostering equal opportu-
nities in the labour market and for granting more
services and more assistance to families with
children. Drawing lesson from the North-Euro-
pean countries, parental leave has become an
important strategy also in the Italian context.
These policy guidelines seem to have been
confirmed and even strengthened in the 2000
NAP, which is now being formulated by national
decision makers.
4. The “Politics” of the Labour Market
As we have described so far, the policy inno-
vations of the 1990s in the field of labour mar-
ket can be summarised in the strong increase of
active policies, in the partial deregulation of the
normative regime of the labour market and in
the shift from state-centred regulation to a new
style of governance, linked to territory and to
local resources.
We argue that these changes have been the
consequence of some endogenous and exog-
enous factors that deeply transformed the Ital-
ian political system in the last decade: a) the
return of co-operative agreements between the
public institutions and the social partners (con-
certed action); b) the upheavals in the party sys-
tem during the politico-institutional transition
of the early 1990s; and c) the influence of the
process of European integration. The dynamic
between these factors has opened up wider
spaces for the experimentation with new initia-
tives and for a more definitive break with the
past.
4.1. Endogenous Factors: Concerted Action
and Political Transition
The return of concertation in the 1990s is
strictly connected with the specific events that
have marked the crisis of the post-war party
government (the so-called “First Republic”) and
that characterised the politico-institutional tran-
sition, that is, the uncertain and fluid period,
which followed. Concertation developed as a
substitute – with no other alternatives – for the
inefficiency of the parliamentary arena in direct-
ing the policy making and for the interrupted
relationship between the cabinet and the parlia-
ment (Salvati 1995; Schmitter/Grote 1997;
Wiarda 1997).6
This was particularly true for the first phase
of concerted action, going from 1992 to 1995,
which can be defined as emergency concer-
tation. In this period of transition, the technical
governments (Amato, Ciampi and Dini) were
the first movers; they deliberately looked for the
help of the social partners in order to counter
the process of the delegitimisation of the politi-
cal parties. The contents of the social pacts have
had primarily a “subtractive nature”: wage re-
straint, block of hirings in the public sector and
abolishment of wage indexations.
The second phase (1996–1998), which was
however closely connected to the first one, can
be called institutionalised concerted action. The
relationship among the actors as well as the con-
tents of the social pacts changed: technical gov-
ernments were no more in power and political
executives restored their role (Prodi and
D’Alema). Moreover, Prime Ministers were at
the head of pro-labour governments (centre-left
party coalitions) favouring the continuation of
concerted action. Since the conditions of the
economy improved and the first positive effects
of the sacrifices of the past were registered, the
“subtractive policies” of the first social pacts
were turned into “expansive policies” – i.e.,
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Table 1. The two phases of concerted action in Italy in the 1990s
Emergency concerted action Institutionalised concerted action
(1992–1995) (1996–1998)
Participants " Technical governments " Political governments (pro-labour);
(as first movers); " higher number of organisations taking
" absence of parties; part in the agreements;
" social partners making up for " partial return of the parties.
parties’ delegitimation.
 Contents " “Subtractive” policies  " “Expansive” policies;
(wage restraint and dismantling  " policies for local development;
of some welfare benefits);  " active policies for the labour market.
" financial adjustment.
policies for local development and policies for
the activation of the labour market (see table
1).
More in detail, the emergency concertation
was initiated in 1992, when the investigations
of the pool of “clean hand” judges reached their
climax and caused the turnover of the entire
political élite and when a violent and sudden
fiscal and monetary crisis hit the country. Prime
Minister Amato, who was at the head of a “tech-
nical” coalition, tried to get an agreement with
the social partners on some effective solutions
and programmes in response to the economic
crisis and to the exigency to adjust to the
Maastricht criteria. In a few months, a huge fi-
nancial manoeuvre was passed in order to slow
down the acceleration of the debt services and
the wage dynamics. It was one of the most im-
posing manoeuvres since the Second World War,
involving 93,000 billion liras. As previewed
above, the most important results of the agree-
ment were the abolition of wage indexations and
the freezing of decentralised, firm-level bargain-
ing for the years 1992 and 1993.
The new Prime Minister Ciampi, who fol-
lowed the path of his predecessor, confirmed
the Amato agreement in 1993: reduction of
labour cost and severe financial adjustment. The
abolition of wage indexations was definitively
introduced, the structure of collective bargain-
ing was completely reformed and a new more
rigorous system of income policy was estab-
lished.
In the meanwhile, the same emergency logic
that had caused the return of concertation in the
labour market and in industrial relations was at
the basis of the reforms in the pensions sector.
Between 1992 and 1993, some non-stop nego-
tiations on the reorganisation of pensions started.
Ciampi was again a central decision maker. He
started negotiating with Confindustria (the big-
gest national large companies’ association) in
order to reach an agreement. But, the govern-
ment led by Ciampi lasted only shortly and his
successor Berlusconi switched to another strat-
egy. Without negotiation, he introduced in the
financial bill for 1995 some measures that tar-
geted at the abolishment of seniority pensions.
Trade unions immediately mobilised against
these “unilateral” prescriptions; they staged a
general strike, which found considerable reso-
nance and led to the cancellation of the agree-
ment. The new Prime Minister Dini then tried
to re-establish the dialogue with trade unions
and was finally successful in getting the con-
sent on a new reform (even though without the
signature of Confindustria), which introduced
a new method for determining pension payments
(the so-called “contributive method”), linking
the amount of benefits to the amount of contri-
butions paid by the workers. A fair balance be-
tween the available resources of the state and
the level of provisions was therefore re-estab-
lished.7
In 1996, when the transition period seemed
to be over because of the re-entry of political
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executives, some important changes could be
observed in the relationship between the gov-
ernment and the social partners. First, the pro-
labour governments (Prodi and D’Alema) stuck
to the experience of social agreements of the
past; second, the healthier economic conditions
showed already the positive effects of stable
concerted action. Hence, concertation seemed
the logical way to go forward, although the fo-
cus now turned to introducing “expansive poli-
cies”.
The “Pact for Work” signed by Prodi and by
the social partners in September 1996 introduced
a conspicuous amount of active policies (tem-
porary work, territorial pacts and area contracts,
the reform of vocational training and the reform
of the education system).
In December 1998, D’Alema finally signed
an agreement with more than 30 associations
(the so-called Xmas Pact), which brought a fi-
nal award to the non-stop sequence of social
pacts of the previous years and established some
rules and norms for the institutionalisation of
concerted action. The method of concertation
was strengthened and it was extended to a wider
number of associations and to sub-national ter-
ritorial levels.
The return to concertation, as described above,
is closely linked to the changes brought in by
the political transition, the second endogenous
change factor: As it is widely known, the struc-
ture of the Italian political system was
characterised, at least until 1992, by high
pluripartitism and a lack of competition (Sartori
1982; D’Alimonte 1978). Multiparty coalition
governments were not based on clearly defined
and shared programmes, but rather on the pro-
portional distribution of offices. These unstable
executives were led by Prime Ministers who
were poorly equipped to adopt a strong role of
co-ordinators, while the ministers who borrowed
their legitimisation directly from political par-
ties enjoyed high autonomy. The lack of verti-
cal co-ordination between the Prime Minister
and the ministers also resulted in a low hori-
zontal inter-ministerial co-ordination. The pos-
sibility to introduce innovative public policies
was often hindered by the pressures posed by
singular interest groups (or clienteles).
The fall of the First Republic brought at least
five crucial changes. In the first place, we wit-
nessed the electoral and organisational crisis of
the old political parties. After the elections of
1994, the first ones with the new majority sys-
tem, the core parties of the Italian party govern-
ment basically disappeared. The crisis hit in the
first place the Christian Democracy and the
Socialist Party. The Christian Democracy, which
had been the majority party since 1946, gained
just 11 per cent of the votes and 5 per cent of
the seats under its new name of Popular Party.
The Socialist Party, which had been the grow-
ing star of the 1980s and which in 1992 had
almost reached the Communist Party, in 1994
basically volatilised with nothing but 2 per cent.
The three smaller coalition parties (the liberals,
the republicans and the social democrats) suf-
fered the same destiny (Cotta/Isernia 1996).
Secondly, the fall of political parties brought
about another related crisis, concerning the over-
all party system and its notorious characteris-
tics, namely policentric structure, lack of com-
petition, predominance of centre-coalitions, low
capacity of leadership. In the third place, the
crisis marked the turnover of an entire political
class. In 1994, 71 per cent of the deputies were
elected for the first time. The causes of the dis-
solution of the old political élite were numer-
ous: the explosion of internal conflicts within
the élite, the moral and judicial discredit of its
leaders and members, the loss of control over
the government and the entry of new actors in
the political arena (Cotta/Verzichelli 1996).
Fourth, the fall of the First Republic changed
the dynamic among the different political insti-
tutions. The relationship between the govern-
ment and the President of the Republic shifted
in favour of the latter, the relationship between
the executive and the parliament shifted in
favour of the former and finally, the relation-
ship between the magistrate and the overall po-
litical system shifted in favour of the judges.
Especially the government was given a higher
concentration in power. The technical govern-
ments led by Amato, Ciampi and Dini, which
were somehow free from a strict party control,
could profit from higher autonomy and from
direct control of the policy making process. They
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enjoyed extraordinary legitimation due not only
to their personal prestige but also to specific
structural factors. The fear of having to call for
quick elections and the necessity not to alarm
the international markets solicited political par-
ties to support the Prime Ministers, who had
been appointed with higher autonomy by the
President of the Republic. Consequently, the
Prime Ministers could adopt a stronger role than
in the past and really co-ordinated the activities
of the single ministers. The final aspect of the
radical political transformation was the entry
into the political arena of new parties and move-
ments. Beside the electoral success of the Lega
Nord already in 1992, whose main claims were
against state’s centralisation and a state system
of taxation, in 1994 a new political movement,
Forza Italia, was founded by Berlusconi and in
just four months organised and won the election.
All these changes – the reform of the elec-
toral system, the turnover of the old political
élite, the entry of new parties – produced a new
political opportunities structure. After a long pe-
riod of immobilism and stagnation, the intro-
duction and the implementation of new policy
reforms and the adoption of a new style of policy
making became more effective than in the past.
4.2. Exogenous Factors: The Process of
European Integration
The third factor that worked as a formidable
spur for innovation in the economic and labour
policies has been the “E-factor”, i.e. the pro-
cess of European integration, which operated
in two different ways. First, as an effect of the
increased competition with the other European
countries it pushed the national government to
deregulate the normative regime of the labour
market. Second, it stimulated a process of com-
pensation from below to supranational policy
making, that is, it contributed to the restoration
of the local, territorial dimension of the policy
making.
The opening up of markets has placed the Ital-
ian economy and the Italian labour market in a
new context, characterised by transactions of a
global nature. The flows of goods and labour
into and out of the country intensified and the
stepping up of transactions inevitably put Italy
in contact with the experiences and regulatory
regimes of other countries, first in Europe and
then in the rest of the world. The rigidity of the
Italian labour market immediately emerged in
its entirety. The difficulty of firing, the complex
procedures for hiring labour, the hyper-bureau-
cratic functioning of the old job-placement of-
fices, and the high labour costs have therefore
become the main targets for protest by the busi-
ness community and in the political debate. The
wave of laws on deregulation and flexibility –
during the 1990s – can be considered the result
of all this.
The increasing globalisation and inter-
nationalisation of markets also induced a revival
of localism and territorial differentiation. Above
all in the South, the continuously growing rate
of unemployment and poverty, together with
high social tensions, encouraged the promotion
of new policy strategies, based on the exploita-
tion of local resources and local institutional
capabilities. These instruments are the already
mentioned territorial pacts and area contracts
and some other similar policies. They require
concerted action among local private and pub-
lic actors and the enactment of specific policy
initiatives linked to the needs of the territory.
The participants in the network are bound to
form a co-operative society for the monitoring
of the project; the financing comes from a com-
bination of public funds and private grants (from
local banks) (De Nardis/Galli 1997). Therefore,
in the national political discourse the idea that
the problem of unemployment cannot be solved
(or even faced) with a centralised unique na-
tional strategy has gained wide acceptance.8
Decision makers are increasingly trying to
modulate the instruments and the legislation
according to the needs of the different territo-
ries. The end of the “extraordinary state’s inter-
vention” in the South was announced in 1992
and contributed to the diffusion of this local
policy paradigm. This trend is bound to con-
tinue since the new rules of the Structural Funds
for the period 2000–2006 seem to put the re-
gions and the local governments at the head of
the policy making, giving them important pow-
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ers to legislate and to decide the distribution of
resources.
In conclusion, the combination of endogenous
and exogenous factors pushed decision makers
in the early 1990s onto the path of reforms.
Policy change has been moulded by mutually
linked strategies, values and ideas.
In the first place, the strengthening of the gov-
ernments, as a direct result of the collapse of
the First Republic’s political parties, gave Prime
Ministers new spaces and new opportunities for
the co-ordination of the policy making process,
weakening the veto and blackmailing power of
political parties. Second, the “technical” nature
and the personal characteristics of the Prime
Ministers (well-known experts in the economic
and financial fields) favoured the radicalism and
the effectiveness of reforms. Third, these inno-
vations could be introduced because the gov-
ernments were able to benefit from a double
legitimisation: a) The Maastricht criteria and the
European requests to join the EMU entered the
national political discourse and presented to the
citizens as a compulsory choice, framed as a
choice between ‘the good’ and ‘hell’; b) The
social partners, having taken the role of politi-
cal parties in the policy making process, had
abandoned the usual strategies of conflict and
dissent, realising the importance to accept short-
term sacrifices in sight of long-term benefits.
Fourth, the specific recipe to introduce the re-
forms was found in consensual co-operation
(concerted action) between the government and
the social partners, drawing lessons from some
other European countries, in particular the Dutch
model (Visser/Hemerijck 1997). Finally, as for
the contents of the policy reforms, the directives
of the European Commission on the one hand,
and the revival of localism as a specific strat-
egy for economic and social development, on
the other, offered a set of ideas to be translated
into new policy instruments.
5. Conclusions
This article described and explained the in-
novations and reforms in the Italian labour mar-
ket policy. Up until the 1990s, the Italian labour
market policies were dominated by distributive
and passive policies, which were often intro-
duced in an incremental way and with no recip-
rocal co-ordination. Parties’ behaviour and strat-
egies were mostly reactive. Labour policies rep-
resented a pre-packed outcome of private ne-
gotiations (between the social partners and the
main political parties). The innovations that
were introduced were not effective enough to
stop the inertial force of this kind of policy pro-
cess. The result was a “punctuated equilibrium”
(Krasner 1984; 1988), where long periods of
stasis were sometimes interrupted by sudden
periods of change. In addition, the First
Republic’s governments were not stable enough
and hence, had not sufficient time to take on
structural innovations. Therefore, reforms more
often turned into some other variant of distribu-
tive micro-policies.
Starting from the 1990s, something has re-
ally changed. Labour market policy making was
deeply transformed as active policies became
predominant and decentralisation and priva-
tisation the main imperatives. The return of
concertation, the events of the political transi-
tion and the consequences of the European in-
tegration have virtuously intertwined in promot-
ing these changes. In other words, changes in
the ‘politics’ somehow prepared the ground for
the changes in the ‘policies’ and a general re-
form dynamic. Without the new constellation
of factors and events emerging in the mid-1990s,
the path of policy change would have surely
been more gradual and more tortuous.
NOTES
1 The literature on Italian labour policies is quite vast.
Just to mention the most relevant works, cf. Reyneri
(1990; 1996), Regalia (1984), Lange/Regini (1987),
Frey (1993), Brunetta (1991; 1993), Gualmini (1997a;
1997b; 1998).
2 For discussion on the so-called “familialistic model
of labour and social policies” cf. Esping-Andersen




3 When not mentioned, statistical data are drawn from
the statistical appendix included in Gualmini (1998).
4 “To work less in order to work at all” was the slogan
of the French school of Guy Aznar (1994). The
French contrat de solidarité was the model for the
Italian solidarity contracts.
5 The annual GDP growth rose from 2.6 per cent in
1985 to 4.1 per cent in 1988 while inflation dimin-
ished from 9 per cent to 5.7 per cent in the same
period of time (OECD 1995).
6 The 1990s concerted action has therefore been very
different from the agreements of the 1970s and 1980s
and has also been different from the theoretical mod-
els suggested by the mainstream literature (Streeck/
Schmitter 1985; Goldthorpe 1989; Lehmbruch/
Schmitter 1982).
7 Before the Dini reform, pensions were calculated on
the basis of the workers’ last five years wage.
8 For discussion, cf. Cossentino/Pyke/Sengenberger
(1997).
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